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ONE OF THE LARGER, and certainly one of the 
most complex, of the world's library systems is made up of the 197 
information centers maintained overseas by the United States De-
partment of State as a part of its international information and edu- 
cational exchange program. These libraries are situated in almost 
every free country (97 in 22 countries in Europe; 41 in 24 countries 
in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa; 52 in 13 Far Eastern coun- 
tries; and 7 in 6 Latin American countries). In physical size they 
may range from a couple of second-floor rooms, as in Algiers, to im- 
posing buildings constructed for their purpose, as in Essen. Their col- 
lections comprise from 2,000 to 30,000 volumes, and they currently 
receive from 50 to more than 450 periodicals. Their staff may be 2 
or 3 local employees with only part-time supervision from an Ameri-
can cultural attache, or at the other extreme it may consist of 20 to 
25 local employees and 3 or even 4 professional librarians. 
A typical library, if there were such a thing, would be in a ground- 
floor location on a business street, probably in a store-site, with a 
reading room seating about 50 persons and an open-shelf collection 
of 5,000 to 7,500 volumes and 200 or 250 magazines. One American 
professional librarian would supervise perhaps 6 or 8 local employees. 
I t  would be visited by 500 or so persons a day and would charge out 
100 to 150 books daily. Perhaps it would have a small auditorium in 
which there were concerts of recordings, film showings, and occa-
sional lectures. Its facilities would be likely to be jammed for all its 
opening hours by people who, in most countries, had never before 
had a library freely open to them, with a staff eager to serve and an 
open-shelf collection of books that could be freely borrowed. Here 
they come not only to learn about America, but also to see the world 
through the eyes of American books. All told, 100,000 persons a day 
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pass through the doors of these libraries, and there is no hour of any 
twenty-four when some American library, from Reykjavik to Kuala 
Lampur, is not filled with eager readers. 
The system had a number of diverse origins, each of which has 
influenced subsequent conceptions of its proper character. One group 
of libraries was created as a manifestation of the "Good Neighbor" 
program in Latin dmerica. As early as July 1941 the Coordinator of 
Inter-American Affairs contracted with the American Library Asso- 
ciation to provide funds for a library to be established and operated 
by the latter in Mexico City. This institution, the Biblioteca Benjamin 
Franklin, opened on April 13, 1942, with Harry M. Lydenberg as its 
first director. Subsequently, and under similar contracts, the American 
Library Association was enabled to open libraries on behalf of the 
American government in Managua, Nicaragua; Montevideo, Uruguay; 
and Buenos Aires, Argentina. The emphasis in the establishment of 
these libraries was on making otherwise unobtainable American books 
available as a measure of good will and as a contribution to inter- 
national understanding, and on providing a demonstration of American 
public library service. 
At about the same time the Office of War Information (OWI)  was 
building up abroad a much larger system of reference libraries as a 
part of its overseas information and propaganda effort. The principal 
ones, beginning with that opened officially in London in 1943, were 
in the British Commonwealth, where their effectiveness was less 
hampered by language difficulties. Their function was defined in a 
statement issued in 1943, and phrased as follows: 
. . . to serve writers, the press, radio, American missions, local govern- 
ment agencies, and educational, scientific, and cultural institutions and 
organizations. They are not lending-libraries for casual readers, nor are 
they in any sense propaganda centers or distributors of pamphlets. 
A small, highly selective library containing reference material produced 
in the United States provides information which can best reach the 
masses of people in an allied country through the media of the press, 
the radio, and educational institutions. ~ e s i d e s  offering direct informa- 
tion on many subjects, the libraries will consult with special libraries 
and will assist libraries and organizations within the respective coun- 
tries in securing for their own use materials about the United States. 
Significant American books and reports will be brought to the attention 
of people likely to be interested in using them.l 
In addition to the dozen or so principal libraries, OW1 maintained a 
[ 147 I 
DAN  LACY 
hundred or more small working collections of recent materials for the 
reference use of its own staff in overseas outposts, and of the foreign 
journalists and commentators with whom they dealt. 
At the close of the war, on August 31, 1945, the President by Execu- 
tive Order transferred to the State Department the overseas informa- 
tion functions of both OW1 and the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs, and directed the Secretary of State to complete by the end 
of the year a study of the need for a continuing information program 
and the character it should assume, and to submit the necessary legis- 
lative and budgetary proposals. In a statement to the press released 
at the same time, he described the functions of the continuing pro- 
gram as the presentation of a "full and fair picture of American life 
and of the aims and policies of the United States Government." The 
requested study was undertaken by Arthur W. Macmahon of Columbia 
University, with the assistance of Haldore Hanson of the State De- 
partment; and although completed somewhat earlier, was released on 
January 5, 1946.3 
On the basis of this report the Secretary of State established, effective 
December 31, 1946, an Office of International Information and Cultural 
Exchange, one of whose components was to be a Division of Libraries 
and Institutes. This Division was to be responsible, among other things, 
for the support of the libraries inherited from OW1 and the Coordi- 
nator's office, the maintenance of which had been named by Secretary 
of State Byrnes in his report to the President of December 31, 1945, 
as first among the wartime information activities to be continued. A 
considerable reduction in the number of collections maintained by 
OW1 was contemplated; and the Department originally planned a 
total of about fifty libraries. I t  was contemplated, however, that though 
the majority of the small OW1 outpost collections would be abol- 
ished, those that were retained would be enlarged and made effective 
institutions. 
The third major group of libraries to be transferred to the control 
of the State Department was that of the Amerika Haueser in Germany. 
After some initial experimentation with small, frequently semi-officially 
sponsored, reading rooms, the Army began in 1947 the opening of 
the group just referred to, which ultimately came to number 26 prin- 
cipal centers, with 137 subsidiary reading rooms4 These institutions 
were materially different in both purpose and character from the OW1 
libraries and those inherited from the Coordinator's office. They had 
as their mission not only the favorable depiction of the United States, 
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but assistance in the cultural and intellectual reintegration of Germany 
with the West, with the consequence that their services and collections 
were much broader in scope than those which appeared elsewhere. 
Moreover, sums were available for the support of the centers in the 
American occupation zone of Germany roughly comparable to those 
provided for all those in the rest of the world put together. This enabled 
them to operate with large-though almost entirely German-staffs 
and to undertake a far wider range of concerts, lectures, discussion 
groups, exhibits, and community activities than was possible otherwise. 
In consequence book services played a relatively less important role 
than in other centers; the library, for example, was likely to be thought 
of, like the concert series, as one of the services of the Amerika Haus 
rather than, as elsewhere, the institution itself. In the autumn of 1949 
responsibility for these units, as part of the obligation for American 
participation in the government of Germany, was transferred from 
the Army to the State Department. Small numbers of information 
centers established by the Army in Austria and Korea similarly were 
removed to the State Department when those countries came under 
civilian control. 
The last major group of libraries to be brought under the State 
Department consisted of the twenty-three information centers main- 
tained by the Army in Japan. These, like the German units, had a 
broader mission than those elsewhere, but they did not attain the 
wealth of resources or the breadth of activity that distinguished the 
German program. The first of the Japanese agencies was opened at 
Tokyo in November 1945; two others, at Kyoto and Nagoya, were 
started in 1947; fourteen were established in 1948; and an additional six 
date from late 1950 and 1951. With the ratification of the peace treaty 
with Japan and the resunlption of sovereignty by that country in April 
1952, their operation became the responsibility of the State Department 
as a part of the United States diplomatic mission to Japan, rather than 
of the Army as a part of the occupation. 
The character and services of this system of libraries were shaped 
not only by its various origins, but also by the changing patterns of 
administration and policy within which it functioned in the Depart- 
ment of State. The administration of the program within the Depart- 
ment was initially entrusted, in January 1946, to an Office of Inter- 
national Information and Cultural Affairs under the Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Public Affairs. The underlying policy consideration 
was that in the circumstances of the mid-twentieth century the effective 
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conduct of international relations required understanding not only 
between governments but between peoples, and that the achievement 
of such understanding required the free dissemination of information 
in areas of ignorance or misinformation. I t  was assumed that this 
diffusion normally would take place through private or commercial 
channels of communication, and that the governmental effort would 
be a supplementary one. "Propaganda" was identified at the time with 
Goebbels and the Nazi regime, and was conceived of as inherently 
an effort to deceive. The Department of State was careful to dissociate 
its information program from such a concept. Said Assistant Secretary 
of State Benton, speaking before the American Platform Guild on 
January 3, 1946: "The State Department does not intend to engage 
in so-called 'propaganda'. We shall profit most by portraying ourselves 
frankly, the bad with the good." 
With the assumption of responsibility from the OWI, the Depart- 
ment sought from Congress explicit legislative authority and adequate 
appropriations. Though enabling legislation, after having passed the 
House and having been favorably reported by the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, failed of final enactment in the closing days of 
the 79th Congress, reasonably adequate appropriations were made. In 
the first session of the highly critical 80th Congress, whose leadership 
was suspicious of the OW1 heritage, of the State Department, and of 
Assistant Secretary Benton, appropriations for the fiscal year ending 
June 30, 1948, were very sharply curtailed. The latter half of 1947 
witnessed a consequent drastic curtailment of the entire information 
program, including library activities. 
An intensive congressional study of the program, however, coupled 
with increased awareness of growing anti-American attitudes abroad 
and of the intensification of Soviet propaganda, led to final passage, 
as the Smith-Mundt Act (Public Law 402, 80th Congress, approved 
January 27, 1948), of authorizing legislation substantially along the 
lines previously proposed by the Department. This statute, in spe- 
cificially authorizing the continuation of overseas information and 
educational exchange activities, enacted into law the basic conception 
of policy objectives which had hitherto governed the Department's ad- 
ministration of the program. Its objectives were "to promote a better 
understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase 
mutual understanding between the people of the United States and 
the people of other countries." 
The Act contemplated two distinct operations, "(1)  an information 
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service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its 
people, and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the 
Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government having 
to do with matters affecting foreign affairs; ( 2 )  an educational ex- 
change service to cooperate with other nations in-(a) the interchange 
of persons, knowledge, and skills; ( b )  the rendering of technical and 
other services; ( c )  the interchange of developments in the field of 
education, the arts, and sciences." An Advisory Commission on In- 
formation and an Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, 
each composed of private citizens, were provided. While the inclusion 
of "information centers" as one of the instruments for the conduct of 
the information service 7 probably indicated a congressional intent that 
the library program be considered as a part of this service, it has in 
fact been administered as a part of the educational exchange service. 
Though the subsequent creation of the Point Four Program, into 
which have been absorbed many of the activities contemplated in the 
Smith-Mundt Act, and the increasing tension of international relations 
have made it in some part obsolete, the Act is a remarkably sound 
and broadly conceived piece of legislation. With this solid base of 
authority it was possible for the Department to set up a relatively 
stable administrative organization and to obtain increasingly adequate 
appropriations. 
Administratively, an Office of International Information and an 
Office of Educational Exchange were established (parallel with an 
Office of Public Affairs responsible for domestic public relations) under 
the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs. The Office of International 
Information was made responsible for the radio, press, and film 
activities, and the Office of Educational Exchange for the "exchange 
of persons" program and the book program. The latter was the spe- 
cific responsibility of a Division of Libraries and Institutes, rechristened 
in 1950 the Division of Overseas Information Centers, which was 
charged with support of libraries and binational "cultural institutes" 
overseas, with the administration of a book translation program, with 
the distribution of American publications abroad, and with collabora- 
tion with publishers to increase the export of American publications. 
These responsibilities were, however, solely for the procurement of 
materials, the development of policy, the technical training of overseas 
personnel, and similar domestic operations. Libraries overseas were 
an integral part of the diplomatic or consular missions to which they 
were attached, reporting to the chief of mission through a Cultural 
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Affairs Officer and his superior, the Public Affairs Officer. Selection 
and assignment of overseas personnel and supervision of overseas oper- 
ations were the primary obligations of "public affairs staffs" attached 
to each of the State Department's regional bureaus, and, in personnel 
matters, of the Division of Foreign Service Personnel. Thus, though 
the staff responsibility for policy, technical guidance, and procurement 
of materials for the United States Library in London was ultimately 
that of the Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, responsibility for its 
housing, staffing, and operation was ultimately that of the Assistant 
Secretary for European Affairs. This division of authority, which has 
continued under various patterns, has affected all informational opera- 
tions except radio, and has made it impossible to place a clear-cut 
responsibility on the one hand for the world-wide library, or any 
similar program, or on the other hand for the total information pro- 
gram in any country or region. 
Meanwhile, the growing international tension and the increasing 
pressure of anti-American Soviet propaganda had been gradually 
altering official conceptions of the information program. The Smith- 
Mundt Act and the State Department's planning had been based on 
the conviction that the widespread general dissemination of accurate 
information about the United States and its policies would contribute 
to a general climate of international understanding, within which the 
foreign policy of the United States could more easily and effectively 
attain its objectives. The support of those particular aims and the 
endeavor to stimulate predetermined behavior on the part of foreign 
audiences had not been thought to be among the purposes. "Propa- 
ganda" had been repeatedly disavowed as an objective and as a 
technique. But it became increasingly obvious that the Soviets and 
their instruments were inimical to the United States not because they 
misunderstood us or were misinformed about us, but because it suited 
their purposes. Confidence that the mere presentation of a "full and 
fair picture" of the United States would dispel hostile attitudes-or 
would do so in time-weakened. The "to know us is to love us" doc- 
trine lost credit in the Department and in Congress. 
The conviction grew that the United States needed a very much 
larger information effort, one frankly propagandistic and polemical, 
and one specifically aimed at thwarting Soviet ends. As early as the 
crucial Italian elections of the spring of 1948 the information program 
"By press, motion picture, and radio . . . tried . . . [its] level best, 
through open propaganda methods, to persuade the Italian voter that 
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democracy, although offering no immediate paradise, was a surer 
method of progress. The Voice of America transmitted short-wave 
radio programs in the Italian language every day, beamed toward the 
people of Italy, extolling the advantages of democracy. Americans of 
Italian origin were encouraged to write to their relatives in Italy, 
counseling them to vote democratic. . . . [It] arranged for American 
newsreels, showing the American way of life and American aid to 
Italy, to be shown in every Italian theater for several weeks prior to 
election day." By December 1949, Assistant Secretary Allen was pre- 
pared to cite this as an example of the proper, or at  least the neces- 
sary, role of the information services in the conduct of foreign affairs, 
and to state that ". . . propaganda on an immense scale is here to stay. 
We Americans must become informed and adept in its use, defensively 
and offensively, or we may find ourselves as archaic as the belted 
knight who refused to take gunpower seriously 500 years ago." 
Acting on this premise, the State Department developed plans for 
the larger and more aggressive program announced by President Tru- 
man in a speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors 
on April 20, 1950,9 which followed a bipartisan resolution introduced 
in the Senate on March 22 by Senator Benton and twelve associates 
calling for "a greatly expanded program of information and educa- 
tion among all the peoples of the world to the full extent they can 
be reached."1° The "campaign of t r u t h  became the slogan for this 
new stage, as "a full and fair picture" had been of the old. Redoubled 
intensity was given the efforts to enlarge and sharpen the program by 
the outbreak of war in Korea. On July 13, 1950, the President sub- 
mitted to Congress a very large supplemental appropriation estimate 
for the information program in the fiscal year then beginning, and 
stated that he regarded "such an expanded campaign of truth as vital 
to our National Security." l1 The major part of the appropriation was 
granted. Though most of this very large increase in funds went into 
the construction of radio facilities and into other direct "propaganda" 
activities, with only a very small increase in the support of the libraries, 
the resulting enlargement and intensification of the whole information 
effort of which the libraries were a part had very important conse- 
quences for them. I t  led in the first place to a series of administrative 
changes. Initially a position of General Manager of the Information 
and Educational Exchange Program was created under the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Public Affairs, in order to bring under a single 
direction the activities previously separately carried on as the in- 
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formation service and the educational exchange service, and to provide 
central planning, policy guidance, and budgetary services. Since con- 
trol of field operations and most administrative matters remained dis- 
persed throughout the Department, however, this step provided neither 
the unity nor the autonomy required. In January 1952 there was estab- 
lished a "semi-autonomous" International Information Administration, 
in which most of the dispersed undertakings, including supervision of 
field activities, were drawn together. The former Office of International 
Information and Office of Educational Exchange were abolished, and 
all organizational distinctions between the two programs were ended. 
The Division of Overseas Information Centers became the Inter- 
national Information Center Service, headed by one of the Assistant 
Administrators of the Information Administration directly responsible 
to the Administrator. 
More important, however, was the fact that the conceptions of 
proper purpose and technique of the program which underlay the 
"campaign of truth" imposed important policy questions for the library 
program. Books, and particularly books organized into a library, differ 
almost diametrically from the so-called mass media in some aspects 
of their communications functions. In television or radio thousands, 
hundreds of thousands, even millions of persons listen at once to a 
single message. Films and press services to an almost equal degree 
excel in the prompt and simultaneous conveyance of one message to 
many auditors. In all these media, moreover, the content is determined 
by the sender or originator, and in all of them the receiver or auditor 
has a very limited choice among a few radio or television programs 
or films or newspapers, that may be actually available at  a given place 
and time. These then would appear to be the ideal instruments for 
any government to use in conveying a predetermined message to a 
large audience. On the other hand, a collection of books in a library 
is intended to afford the user opportunity to seek out the information 
he wants from a multiplicity of sources. I t  is the one medium in which 
the reader is boss; and thousands of books compete for his attention, 
with the result that the content of the communication is largely con- 
trolled by the receiver. For this reason a library would appear to serve 
as an excellent antidote to false propaganda by giving its users a chance 
to seek out the truth for themselves; but for the same reason it would 
seem a poor instrument to "put across" any particular predetermined 
idea, even though true. 
An awareness of this fact entered the thinking of both the admin- 
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istrators of the information program, who were men experienced pri- 
marily in the "mass media" technique of advertising and journalism 
and who tended to be skeptical of the propaganda effectiveness of 
the libraries, and the staff specifically responsible for the library pro- 
gram, who were doubtful of the validity of the new emphasis and 
particularly of its applicability to their operations. Over the last two 
years a principal problem has been to resolve this apparent incom- 
patibility by working out sound conceptions of the role of libraries in 
a propaganda program, and of the modifications in the character of 
the typical American public library which that role requires. 
It was possible by the end of 1952 to believe that a real, if not yet 
formalized, consensus had been attained on these questions. In general 
it held that achieving the peculiar utility possible to libraries in the 
information program required preserving precisely the qualities of 
integrity and candor that had established their credibility, but directing 
their service toward those groups and those areas of knowledge with 
respect to which the availability of a free and honest library service 
best served the interests of the United States. 
The working out of a soundly based conception of the role of libraries 
in the information program posed its most interesting problems in the 
fields of book selection and of kinds of service offered. It has been a 
common suspicion, here and abroad, that the propaganda objectives 
of the State Department have required a distortion of book selection 
criteria, so that a user of one of the overseas libraries would have not 
an honest opportunity to learn the truth about the United States, but 
only a partial and biased presentation. On this point the record of the 
State Department is clear and distinguished. Though the different 
roles of its libraries and of public libraries at home establish different 
bases of book selection, the Department saw with complete clarity 
from the beginning that it would be fatal to the success of the libraries 
if their content were restricted to works eulogistic of the United States 
and its policies. Repeatedly its representatives have stated this position 
with vigor, and they have been sustained in this view by the recom- 
mendations of the professional advisory committees whose counsel has 
been sought.l2> l3 
This policy has been regularly followed in book selection, and 
mature appraisals of every aspect of American life are to be found 
in the collections, along with expressions of the entire range of 
responsible political and economic views held in the United States. 
Works embodying fascist or communist doctrine are not presented, 
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nor are publications of organizations officially found by the Justice 
Department to be subversive. More care than is perhaps necessary 
in a public library in the United States is used in the selection of 
works that are highly partisan on any side of a question and that 
hence may be misunderstood by a foreign reader with inadequate 
background to appraise them. But with these exceptions-if they 
be exceptions-the fact that the libraries are instruments of foreign 
policy has not distorted the criteria of book selection toward the ex- 
clusion or suppression of works otherwise appropriate for inclusion. 
The position of the Department of State perhaps was most fully stated 
in a letter of November 6, 1952, from Reed Harris, as Acting Admin- 
istrator of the International Information Administration, to the Li- 
brarian of Congress : 
. . . our Information Centers differ from public libraries in that the 
latter are in effect, owned by and responsible to their users. I t  would 
be, in theory, improper for the librarian of such an institution to have 
predetermined points of view to which he sought, through the collec- 
tions and services of the library, to persuade its users. We, on the 
other hand, do have a predetermined set of points of view to which we 
hope to win the adherence of as much of mankind as may be, and 
our libraries abroad are one of our instruments for doing so. Where 
the purpose of an American public library is, in theory, only to enlarge 
the arena in which ideas may compete for acceptance, it is the pur- 
pose of our institutions to enter a set of ideas in the competition. The 
theoretical bases of our book selection practices are hence necessarily 
different from those underlying the practices of public libraries at  
home because their ends are different. 
I must add, however, that this distinction, though not without some 
practical consequences, is more important in theory than in applica- 
tion. Most American librarians do in fact have a commitment to certain 
basic principles and ideas, to the strengthening of which they gladly 
devote the resources and services of their institutions-as in the 
American Heritage Program of the American Library Association. 
And these basic ideas are, on the whole, substantially identical or at  
least consistent with the basic principles which it is the explicit pur- 
pose of our institutions to forward. We unite, I believe, in the advocacy 
of democracy as a means of government and an ideal of social rela- 
tionships, of freedom from authoritarian control in the realm of the 
mind, of the united action of free countries in the international sphere, 
and of boldness and firmness in seeking a just and stable peace. The 
use of library resources in support of the aims of American foreign 
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policy is a mean and degrading use of them only if those ends are 
thought to be mean and disingenuous. 
Moreover, even though our libraries are devoted to winning ad- 
herents to these and similar points of view, a wise man does not seek 
to gain the confidence and support of his friends by mendacity or 
guile, nor is it consistent with the dignity of the United States Govern- 
ment to use such devices in its libraries. We seek rather to provide a 
wide and honestly selected range of responsible works on the United 
States, works representing American scholarship and culture, and works 
expressing the diversity of responsible American opinion on public 
and world affairs. We not only do not hesitate to include works re- 
sponsibly critical of the United States or of the foreign policies of the 
United States; we have included many such in book packets to assure 
their availability. Recent book packets have included, among many 
examples, Berger's Equality by Statute; Record's The Negro and the 
Communist Party; Taft's A Foreign Policy for Americans; Hoover's 
Memoirs; Chambers's Witness; and Biddle's Fear of Freedom. Myrdal's 
American Dilemma and the Kefauver book are generally available. 
We do not of course use works that are seditious in their intent or 
that embody or express Communist propaganda, any more than we 
would have done in the case of Nazi propaganda.14 
The absence of pressures toward the distortion of book selection 
policies arising from the role of the libraries in the information pro- 
gram should, however, be clearly distinguished from the pressures 
arising from the domestic controversiality of authors. The informa- 
tion program itself has always been controversial. It has not been 
firmly grounded in congressional acceptance. Its principal officer has 
changed almost annually, and none has been in office long enough to 
acquire solid congressional respect. The appropriations, which must 
be sought annually-or more frequently, in the case of supplements- 
and defended before skeptical or hostile committees in both House 
and Senate, have fluctuated widely. All of these factors have made 
the responsible officers of the Department and the information pro- 
gram nervously anxious to avert public or congressional criticism 
and to placate attackers. In consequence the information program 
has been unusually susceptible to the sorts of pressures that are 
brought against all libraries to remove books offensive to particular 
groups or individuals. The Department has generally resisted these 
when they have been addressed to general policy; it has, e.g., con-
sistently rejected proposals that would have eliminated the more 
'liberal" news magazines from its collections. It has, however, fre- 
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quently yielded when there were protests regarding particular titles 
or works of specific authors, especially if they came in connection with 
appropriation hearings. The Department, for example, withheld from 
general use a particular issue of the Reporter attacking Senator Mac- 
Carran after the Senator had raised objections in an appropriation 
debate,15 and in the following year assured the Senator that none of 
the works of Dr. or Mrs. Harry Overstreet would be used in the 
program.16 On the whole, however, the remarkable thing is that there 
has been so little congressional pressure, rather than so much. It has 
come up sporadically from individual members, and with hit-or-miss 
reference to an occasional author or book. Whenever the issue has 
been publicly joined before the House or Senate as a whole, as in the 
Reporter case, Congress has taken a firm and enlightened position. 
Any general influence on selection has come rather from anxiety 
within the Department than from Congress itself, and prior to 1953 
it had not had any important effect on the quality of the collections. 
In this otherwise perhaps unimportant if undignified scurrying about 
there was, however, a policy issue of fundamental importance. This 
had been most clearly stated by Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin i~ 
questioning Foy Kohler, then head of the Voice of America, in the 
Senate appropriations hearings on June 5, 1952: 
Senator McCARTHY. Let me ask you this: Do you have any test, 
not insofar as the material is concerned, but insofar as the author is 
concerned, as to whether or not you would use this material? If, for 
example, you find that he had been affiliated with, say, five organiza- 
tions officially listed as fronts for the Communist Party, would you use 
his material if the material looked good to you? 
Mr. KOHLER. The answer to that, speaking for the radio operation, 
is "No." Obviously, our facilities for screening are limited. 
We have a committee which tries to keep a list of all the names.17 
The adoption for the library program of the policy implicit in Senator 
McCarthy's question would have presented two problems. In the first 
place, it would have required, as Kohler's answer indicated, the 
preparation of a list-in effect a blacklist-of authors whose political 
affiliations or history or whose "controversiality" might be adjudged 
to make them unfit to have any of their works represented in the USIS 
libraries, regardless of the utility or disutility to the program of the 
works themselves. Moreover, a list of this kind, as Kohler's answer also 
indicated, would have to be prepared with few or no adequate facilities 
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for investigation or adjudication and hence based in large degree on 
such uninvestigated and unevaluated "derogatory information" as 
might be available. Further, the list-if it were to achieve its obvious 
objective of avoiding possible congressional criticism-would have to 
go far beyond the relatively few genuinely subversive writers (whose 
works would, of course, almost never be used in any case because of 
lack of utility) and would have to include many loyal persons whose 
views or activities were "controversial" or might be objectionable to 
the members of Congress most active in the matter. For the Depart- 
ment of State of the United States to attempt to make judgments sys- 
tematically on such grounds obviously would raise questions of public 
policy of a grave character. 
In the second place, and perhaps even more importantly, to allow 
other considerations to override the fundamental question of utility 
to the program would mean that the Information Administration would 
deny itself access to weapons needed in its work in order to avert 
domestic criticism. Insofar as genuinely subversive writers were con- 
cerned, the practical effect would be small, since only in very rare and 
special cases could their products be used to advantage; but if such 
considerations were expanded to include writers who might be con- 
sidered "controversial," the effect on the library program might be 
crippling. On many subjects the most effective presentations of the 
American point of view have been by writers who might fall into that 
class; and in the general field of culture and literature it was obviously 
impossible to present an adequate representation of American achieve- 
ment confined to safely conservative writers. Worst of all, perhaps, 
the wholesale weeding that would be necessary to reduce the present 
library holdings to the works of assuredly "noncontroversial" writers 
could not have been concealed, and would seriously damage the com- 
munity standing of the institutions. 
In a specific earlier case, when the Department became aware of 
the presence of clearly harmful works by Howard Fast in some over- 
seas centers (largely but by no means entirely, in Amerika Haueser 
in Germany, and inherited from earlier gifts and transfers), the De- 
partment had taken prompt remedial action both as to present hold- 
ings and as to future policy. This was done on the basis of a careful 
consideration of the actual utility of Fast's individual works, in the 
light of his reputation abroad as a Soviet-endorsed author. The in- 
structions prohibited completely the use of Fast's novels, except for a 
group-largely written during the "popular front" period of World 
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War 11-which were highly laudatory of the United States and were 
clearly contrary to the present party line. This group could continue to 
be used when in the judgment of the local mission overseas Fast's credi- 
bility among pro-Communist groups made them useful propaganda. 
The principles implicit in these instructions were considered in detail 
and at length by the Department's Advisory Commission on Books 
Abroad, consisting of Martin R. P. McGuire, Professor, the Catholic 
University of America; Cass Canfield, Chairman of the Board, Harper 
& Brothers; Robert L. Crowell, President, Thomas Y. Crowell Company; 
Robert Downs, Director of Libraries, University of Illinois; Lewis 
Hanke, Director, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of 
Texas; George P. Brett, Jr., President, Macmillan Company; Keyes D. 
Metcalf, Director of Libraries, Harvard University; and by its Ad- 
visory Commission on Educational Exchange, consisting of J. L. 
Morrill, President, University of Minnesota; Mark Starr, Educational 
Director, International Ladies Garment Workers Union; Edwin B. 
Fred, President, University of Wisconsin; Harold Willis Dodds, Presi- 
dent, Princeton University; and Mr. LlcGuire, mentioned above as a 
member of the Commission on Books Abroad. 
Both of these bodies made unanimous recommendations through 
channels to the Secretary of State, to the effect that the Department 
should be free to use whatever works most effectively served the pur- 
poses of the information program, and that these judgments should 
be based on the materials themselves. Further extensive discussion led 
to the adoption of that general principle, with a number of safeguards 
against its abuse, as a general policy of the Information Administration, 
and to its announcement in a document issued February 3, 1953. 
I t  appeared therefore to be firmly concluded that the selection of 
books for the collections would be determined primarily with regard 
to the effectiveness of libraries in the information program, and to 
a conviction that the libraries gained their effectiveness from a con- 
fidence on the part of their users that here they had a genuine means 
to seek the truth. Within this broad pattern, book selection would 
emphasize those areas that were of primary concern in foreign policy 
(especially, of course, international relations, history, economics, and 
political science); would fit the level of the collections to the needs of 
the most useful audiences; would base the emphasis in such fields as 
technical books and children's books on their value in furnishing in-
formation; and would exclude works of subversive or hostile intent. 
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On the other hand, in the fields it professed to cover, the book selection 
process would establish the candor and integrity of the library. 
Even more complex were the problems of determining the particular 
audiences the libraries should try to reach and the services they should 
attempt to render. Initially the overseas libraries offered their services 
passively and equally to all. The free and indiscriminate availability 
of their resources became in fact one of their widely advertised vir- 
tues, and was put forward as a symbol of American democracy and 
egalitarianism. Unquestionably it made a deep impression abroad, and 
was one of the sources of the remarkable popularity and respect which 
the libraries attained. With the inauguration of the "campaign of truth" 
came a recognition of the need for a sharpening of objectives, in terms 
both of ideas to be conveyed and of audiences to be reached. The 
entire information program had aimed at the broadest possible dis- 
semination of facts, in the hope that within the intellectual climate 
this dissemination would help to achieve, the right concepts would 
grow in the right spots. The "campaign of t r u t h  sought to move 
directly toward the implantation of specific ideas in specific places. 
In the case of the libraries a certain automatic selectivity had taken 
place in consequence of the facts that only a minority of the population 
in most countries could make use of high-level books in a foreign 
language, and that the libraries existed in only a few large metro- 
politan centers. It  was increasingly thought that the information pro- 
gram must move more directly to win over such groups as urban labor, 
farmers and farm workers, and the lower economic levels of the 
white-collar class, to whom Communism made a special appeal. One 
consequence was a belief that the libraries must extend their services 
to interest such groups by exhibits, film showings, group discussions, 
and lectures, and by the inclusion of a larger proportion of simple 
vernacular materials in their collections. The Amerika Haus network, 
which had been remarkably successful in reaching large segments of 
the German population by carrying on a comprehensive program in 
which book services were only one element, became the model for 
this concept of the library operation. The substitution in 1950 of the 
term "information center" for "library" in official usage was intended 
to symbolize the broader emphasis. 
At the same time, there was criticism of the fact that a high propor- 
tion of the persons who did make extensive use of the libraries be- 
longed to an upper economic and social group already friendly to the 
United States, and that the libraries were, in effect, preaching to the 
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converted. There was occasionally an expression of the view that 
restrictive measures should reduce the expenditure of effort on un-
rewarding sections of the clientele; but it was in general clearly 
recognized that a serious loss of reputation and effectiveness would 
follow any departure from the policy that the United States libraries 
were for everyone. 
Analysis of the actual resources of the library system, however, 
showed that any thought of making it an effective instrument for 
reaching directly any large proportion of the population was chimerical. 
In all of England there was one USIS library of less than 20,000 vol- 
umes. In India the ratio of libraries to population was as if one very 
small-town public library of five to six thousand volumes had to serve 
the whole United States east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio 
and Potomac. Any general effort toward the indiscriminate enlarge- 
ment of the potential audience seemed in this circumstance patently 
unnecessary. The example of the Amerika Haueser was fallacious in 
that, as has been indicated, almost as much was expended on their 
service to the 22,000,000 residents of the American zone of occupation, 
as on the libraries serving the more than one billion persons in the 
other countries in which the program operated. Results comparable 
to theirs were likely to be obtained only by a similar per capita ex- 
penditure elsewhere, which was quite beyond imagination. 
Particularly in such countries as those of northern and western 
Europe, in which the population is well served by their own media of 
communication-their own radio networks, press services, book pub- 
lishers, and libraries-and in which a very high proportion of the total 
population is politically effective, it seemed obviously desirable that 
the libraries should concentrate their attention on those persons and 
institutions from which information would be passed on through in- 
digenous channels to the population at large, and on those persons 
and institutions capable of making decisions and taking action in the 
political and economic sphere. In concrete terms, this meant that such 
persons as professors, authors, journalists, commentators, and the like 
on the one hand, and political leaders, industrialists, trades union 
officials, and the like on the other (opinion-moulders and decision- 
makers, respectively) were the people whom the libraries needed to 
serve and from whose service they should not be diverted by efforts 
to enlarge the "grass-roots" approach. 
As one moved into less developed countries, this conclusion became 
less clear-cut. In southeast Asia, for example, the absence of similar 
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institutions of their own to which they would normally turn for in- 
formation, and the fact that the politically effective members of the 
population were but a very small fraction of the whole, made it con- 
ceivable that a system of American institutions could attract and could 
serve directly a significant proportion of the politically effective popu- 
lation. At the same time, the paucity or inadequacy of indigenous 
channels, such as press and radio, made such direct contact necessary 
if the ultimate recipients of information were to be reached at all. 
Even here, however, the answer probably lay not so much in attempt- 
ing to enlarge the audience reached by the library service itself, as in 
devising simpler and less expensive institutions in which direct con- 
tacts could take place through nonliterary media. 
From these considerations emerged the conclusion that the first 
function of the libraries was to serve as a competent, reliable, and 
comprehensive source of accurate information about the United States 
and about international affairs in which the United States has an 
interest; that its primary audience should be the people whose official 
actions might be affected by such information and the people through 
whom such information could be disseminated to the politically effec- 
tive population at large; that every feasible means should be used to 
call the library's services to the attention of such persons and to 
facilitate use of them, including individual calls by the library staff; 
that service should continue to be freely offered to all who seek it, 
but that no efforts should be made to promote the enlarged indis- 
criminate public use of the library to the detriment of its services to 
its primary audience; and that in less developed countries a more 
flexible program aimed at direct contact with politically effective mem- 
bers of the general public should be developed. 
This synthesis of views, in which the libraries served neither as 
neutral and passive instruments in the general dissemination of ideas 
on the one hand, nor as disingenous instruments of "propaganda" on 
the other, but as carefully used means of bringing to specific audiences 
on specific issues an information service of high intergrity, was em-
bodied in a manual of library operation completed but not issued at 
the time of the writing of this article, and was gradually being realized 
in the actual operation of the centers overseas. 
There has been increasing evidence of the effectiveness of the 
libraries as components of the information program, and of the public 
and administrative recognition of that effectiveness. The New York 
Times,in a survey of the total overseas information program by its 
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foreign correspondents published in its November 24, 1952, issue, said: 
In all the reports received, hardly an ill word was uttered about 
any of the U.S.I.S. libraries. Wherever operated they seemed to stand 
in relation to foreign students, teachers and others with special interests 
as the films stood to the public in general. 
In Britain the libraries appeared to be growing more popular, in 
France they were popular with many thousands, in West Germany 
they were the best liked and most successful of all United States propa- 
ganda mediums, in the Netherlands they were one of the most suc- 
cessful United States activities, in Belgium they were popular, in 
Switzerland they were very popular, in Italy they have had a large 
and healthy growth, in Spain they were so popular they were unable 
to cope with the demand, in Yugoslavia they were well attended, and 
in Greece and Turkey they were very popular. 
From the Middle East it was reported that the libraries were usually 
well filled and much used for reference, and from South Africa that 
they were very popular, being the only libraries open to nonwhites, 
who constituted 40 per cent of the book borrowers. 
Generally the same conditions prevailed in the Far East. The Indian 
report was that there was no doubt of the good work done by the 
libraries, in Pakistan they were found to be the most effective Ameri- 
can operation there, in Japan some were very popular, some not, on 
Formosa they were very valuable and always crowded, in Burma they 
were a tremendous success, in Thailand they were popular, especially 
with the youth, and in the Philippines they were widely used, par- 
ticularly by students. 
Latin-American reports confirmed the general impression. Mexico 
found the libraries very popular, eminently worth while and most 
efficient from the standpoint of direct results for money spent. In 
Panama the effort was said to be very important though generally in- 
adequate; in Nicaragua, the most effective program there, and in 
Guatemala, more helpful than any other agency in creating good will. 
There has been a heavy turnover of books in the Buenos Aires 
library in Argentina, where reference books have been found especially 
useful.ls 
Within the State Department as well, reports from the field assigned 
a constantly higher evaluation to the work of these institutions. And 
a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, created 
to investigate the overseas information programs of the United States 
and working under the chairmanship of Senator Fulbright, in an 
interim report of January 30, 1953, proposed as one of two recom- 
mendations for improving the information program that "we should 
C 1641 
Aid to National Policy 
give more attention to developing the fuller potentiality of those here- 
tofore relatively unexploited programs involving libraries, exchanges, 
book publications, cultural relations activities, and other relatively 
long-range activities, which have frequently been more effective in 
creating understanding and support for America than the mass 
media." l9 
This was the situation as the new administration took office in 
January. Without question the character and effectiveness of the 
overseas libraries would be shaped in the future, as in the past, by 
the administrative structure within which they operated, and by the 
governing policies of the total program of which they were a part. 
Here there was a confusing congeries of trends and possibilities. 
Almost everyone was in agreement that the organization and policies 
of the overseas information program needed a fundamental rethinking, 
but there was a wide divergence of views as to the direction in which 
a reconsideration should lead. 
In the area of fundamental policy two basically different, even 
opposed, trends of opinion were emerging. One, reflecting perhaps 
the views of those most intimately familiar with foreign reactions to 
the American information program, held that insofar as our activities 
in the rest of the free world were concerned our propaganda had been 
too direct, too shrill, too polemical and, in a sense, too patronizing. 
I t  was increasingly felt that a view implicit in much thinking about 
the information program, namely, that the minds and allegiances of 
friends or potential friends were objects of policy, to be manipulated 
to serve American ends, was repugnant to American principles and 
deeply offensive to the very people it sought to win. Adherents of 
this general opinion were inclined to favor a reduction in press and 
radio output to the free world, and a restriction of that output to 
factual reporting somewhat after the fashion of the BBC. They also 
tended to favor an increase in long-range cultural activities aimed at 
the creation of an honest understanding between the United States 
and its allies-a bond of common purpose founded upon a common 
appreciation of the facts of international life and a common ideological 
outlook. They recognized that the exigencies of the time would not 
await the leisurely and unguided growth of such understanding, and 
that vigorous and carefully directed efforts would be necessary to 
create it; but these efforts needed, they believed, to be candid, intel- 
lectually mature, quiet, and aimed at the fundamental ideological 
sources of attitudes rather than at the day-to-day play of attitudes on 
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particular issues. Spokesmen of this view were likely to deprecate a 
too exclusive emphasis on anti-Communist propaganda, holding that 
the problem was basically one of establishing a sound ideological basis 
for a free world order, to which negative propaganda could make only 
a limited contribution. 
In partial opposition to the emphasis on positive, long-range, cultural 
activities was the opinion that elimination of the Soviet menace to 
Western civilization must be the immediate and transcendent objective 
of all our efforts, and that the stress in the information program should 
be on direct and aggressive psychological warfare-an emphasis to 
which all more remote and general efforts should be subordinated. 
Views on the appropriate organizational placement of the informa- 
tion program were varied in the extreme, and seemed likely to be 
influenced by those on general policy. Proponents of a more militant 
propaganda program were disposed to advocate creation of a separate 
agency, divorced from the State Department, for carrying it out. 
Those seeking enlargement of the cultural phases of the program were 
apt in turn to urge their separation from the "propaganda" activities. 
Questions of the proper organization and basic policy of the in- 
formation program are currently the subject of two major inquiries. 
The Senate on June 30, 1952, passed Senate Resolution 74, authorizing 
the Committee on Foreign Relations to conduct an investigation of 
the objectives, operation, and effectiveness of all foreign information 
programs of the United States government. The subcommittee ap- 
pointed under this resolution, chaired by Senator Fulbright of Arkansas 
and after its extension in the 83rd Congress by Senator Hickenlooper 
of Iowa, undertook a sober and careful study, with special attention 
to the longer-range cultural elements of the program. Its interim report 
of January 30, 1953, already cited, laid emphasis on the library pro- 
gram, but at the time of writing its inquiries are still in progress. 
The President meanwhile appointed a committee under the chair- 
manship of William Jackson, with a somewhat similar directive. Most 
of the members of this group, charged with submitting to the Presi- 
dent by June 30, 1953, plans for the organization and conduct of the 
government's total overseas psychological effort, were men experienced 
in psychological warfare and in the use of mass media; and it was 
beIieved that their study would be primarily concerned with the type 
of operation pertinent to these. 
To the two constructive projects named there was added in Febru- 
ary 1953 an inquiry by the Permanent Investigating Subcommittee of 
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the Senate Committee on Government Operations, which was devoted 
to exposing "subversion and waste" in the Voice of America but which 
soon extended itself to other elements in the information program. 
This investigation, under the chairmanship of Senator McCarthy of 
Wisconsin, touched immediately on the question of the use of ma-
terials by "controversial" authors. Extracts from the Department's 
directives on this point were quoted in ways which suggested that 
they were an attempt to infiltrate Communist propaganda; and the 
full texts, which would have made their opposite intent self-evident, 
were not published. In the resultant confusion the new administra- 
tion of the Department, which had just taken office and was not 
familiar at first hand with the situation, was reported in the press to 
have rescinded the two previous directives; to have issued one for- 
bidding the use under any circumstances of anything written by a 
"controversial person, Communists, fellow travelers, etc."; 20 to have 
modified this a few days later by deleting "controversial person"; 21 
to have caused the issuance of a directive to publishers exporting ma- 
terials under the Information Media Guarantee Program which re-
quired them to certify that nothing so exported was by a "Communist, 
fellow traveler, or person who might be considered controversial"; to 
have rescinded this by telegram; 22 and finally to have issued a directive 
which was not shown to the press but was described by Department 
representatives as prohibiting the use in USIS libraries of books by 
Communists and of periodicals that consistently presented Communist 
propaganda. 
Some members of the press understood from comments by Depart- 
ment personnel that the latest directive would be confined in its appli- 
cation to 'Xnown Communists," and that no author would be excluded 
merely because someone disagreed with his views or he was thought 
to be "left of center." 23 If this interpretation is correct the new in- 
structions, though approaching the problem differently, would sub- 
stantially confirm the Department's previous practice, and in some 
respects would be more permissive than the previously rescinded 
directives. In a later official statement, however, the Department dis- 
tinguished between "clear cases" about which there would be "no 
problem," and "other cases" in which the officers responsible for the 
program would make determinations on the basis of all sources avail- 
able to the go~e rnmen t .~~  This comment suggests that there was in 
fact contemplated a systematic inquiry into the loyalty of authors 
whose books were purchased, at least to the extent of a check of the 
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files of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and similar 
records. The probability was that in the absence of investigative 
facilities to provide the basis of a more informed determination, there 
would be strong pressure to ban an author about whom there was 
more than trivial "derogatory information" in the Committee files, in 
order to avoid getting into an area of doubt. I t  is of some interest 
that Senator McCarthy, who had seen the directive, as the reporters 
had not, expressed himself as entirely satisfied with it. 
Much depended on the spirit in which the directive would be 
applied, as well as on its actual content. It  was certainly possible to 
operate a sound and successful library program under its announced 
terms; it was equally possible to apply it in ways that would discredit 
the libraries overseas and seriously limit their effectiveness. 
In this confused situation certain elemental facts seemed to be clear. 
One was that foreign policy could not free itself from responsibilities 
of public persuasion. The difficulty in obtaining ratification of the 
European Defense Community treaty by the very European powers 
which had planned and drawn it-a difficulty which threatened the 
whole basis of American foreign policy in Europe-showed with pain- 
ful clarity how fruitless is an agreement between governments to which 
their respective peoples have not been persuaded. A second was that 
no day-to-day efforts at producing conviction could be successfuI unless 
they could rely on the existence of a substratum of common under-
standing and values. The achievement of this in turn could be hoped 
for only from a program which sought not to manipulate the minds 
of friendly nations toward American ends, but which, out of "a decent 
respect to the opinions of mankind," aimed to hold clearly before the 
world principles of universal validity, deserving the assent of other 
nations and their full association in seeking common goals. 
The truths on which such a structure of universal belief and purpose 
could be erected were no longer so few or so self-evident as they 
were in 1776,and successful persuasion of a lasting kind today required 
extensive and candid communication between peoples on very com- 
plex questions of ideology. I t  was also obvious that books were one 
of the few competent vehicles for this necessary commerce of ideas, 
and that any successful program would require their wise and skillful 
use. However awkward our steps toward mastering that use, it seemed 
a safe prophecy that libraries, as a principal means for the employ- 
ment of books, would become an increasingly important instrument 
of the foreign policy of the United States. 
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